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During the last two years of the Bush Administration, the u.s. immigration and Customs enforcement agency (iCe) vastly expanded its use of home raid operations as a method to locate and apprehend individuals suspected of civil immigration law 
violations. these home raids generally involve teams of heavily armed iCe agents making pre-
dawn tactical entries into homes, purportedly to apprehend some high priority target believed 
to be residing therein. iCe has admitted that these are warrantless raids and, therefore, that 
any entries into homes require the informed consent of residents. However, frequent accounts 
in the media and in legal filings have told a similar story of constitutional violations occurring 
during iCe home raids — a story that includes iCe agents breaking into homes and seizing all 
occupants without legal basis.
this report is the first public effort to compile and analyze the available evidence regarding the 
prevalence of constitutional violations occurring during iCe home raids. through two Freedom 
of information Act lawsuits, the authors of this report obtained significant samples of iCe arrest 
records from home raid operations in new York and new Jersey.  Analysis of these records, 
together with other publicly available documents, reveals an established pattern of misconduct 
by iCe agents in the new York and new Jersey Field offices. Further, the evidence suggests that 
such pattern may be a widespread national phenomenon reaching beyond these local offices. the 
pattern of misconduct involves:
• ICe agents illegally entering homes without legal authority  –  for example, 
physically pushing or breaking their way into private residences.
• ICe agents illegally seizing non-target individuals during home raid operations  
–  for example, seizing innocent people in their bedrooms without any basis. 
• ICe agents illegally searching homes without legal authority  –  for example, 
breaking down locked doors inside homes.
• ICe agents illegally seizing individuals based solely on racial or ethnic 
appearance or on limited english proficiency.
the report analyzes the variety of factors that have contributed to this pattern of iCe misconduct 
including: 2006 changes in iCe performance expectations; the inability of suppression motions 
or civil lawsuits to serve as a meaningful deterrent to iCe misconduct; and serious management 
and oversight failures by iCe supervisors.  in order to correct course and to improve the ability 
of iCe to carry out its mission, we propose several policy recommendations aimed at: setting 
appropriate limits on the use of home raids; revising iCe’s warrant & consent practices; improving 
supervision and training of iCe home raid teams; minimizing harm to local community policing 
executive summAry
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efforts; minimizing the intrusion to non-targets encountered during iCe home raids; and 
improving accountability for iCe agents and supervisors involved in illegal home raids.  our key 
recommendations include, among others:
ICe should use home raids as a tactic of last resort, and then, only to make •	
criminal arrests or civil arrests for targets who pose a real risk to national 
security or who have violent criminal records.
ICe should obtain judicial warrants in advance of any home raid.•	
ICe should require a high level supervisor to be on site for any home raid.•	
ICe should videotape home raids.•	
ICe should issue clear guidance that the sole objective of a home raid is to •	
apprehend the target  —  agents should not generally question non-targets 
encountered about matters other than the location of the target.
the department of Homeland security’s (dHs) Office of the Inspector •	
General (OIG) should undertake an investigation of the pattern of misconduct 
established in this report to better assess the national scope of the problem.
dHs and/or the department of Justice should enact regulations disallowing the •	
use of evidence in immigration removal proceedings when such evidence has 
been obtained through violation of the Constitution. 
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the u.s. immigration and Customs enforcement agency (iCe or “the Agency”) of the Department of Homeland security (DHs or “the Department”), created in 2003, is primarily responsible for the enforcement of immigration laws in the interior of the united states.1  iCe 
has historically used a number of strategies to locate and apprehend persons suspected of violating 
civil and criminal provisions of the immigration and nationality Act 2 (inA).  such strategies include, 
among others, coordinating with local criminal justice systems to identify deportable immigrants 
who have been arrested on criminal charges, coordinating with the united states Citizenship 
and immigration services agency to identify deportable immigrants who have applied for some 
form of immigration benefit, and conducting 
traditional criminal investigations of persons 
suspected of violating the criminal provisions 
of the inA. During the last two years of 
the Bush Administration, iCe substantially 
increased its use of one particular enforcement 
tactic: high profile swat-style raids on homes 
and workplaces targeting civil immigration 
violators.3 Much has been written on the 
phenomenon of workplace raids and iCe has, 
in fact, recently revised its guidelines for such 
raids.4  However, relatively little public scrutiny 
has been focused on the related phenomena 
of iCe home raids.  this report seeks to begin 
filling that void.
starting in 2006, a growing body of evidence 
has arisen which suggests that many iCe 
agents have failed to routinely observe 
constitutional requirements in carrying out 
iCe home raid operations. Citizens and non-citizens alike are protected by the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.5  However, frequent accounts in the media 
and in legal filings have told a similar story of Fourth Amendment violations occurring during iCe 
home raids.  From these accounts, the picture that emerges of a typical home raid depicts a team 
of heavily armed iCe agents approaching a private residence in the pre-dawn hours, purportedly 
seeking an individual target believed to have committed some civil immigration violation.  Agents, 
armed only with administrative warrants, which do not grant them legal authority to enter private 
dwellings, then push their way in when residents answer the door, enter through unlocked doors 
or windows or, in some cases, physically break into homes.  once inside, agents immediately 
seize and interrogate all occupants, often in excess of their legal authority and even after they 
have located and apprehended their target  —  though in the large majority of cases, no target 
is apprehended.  While these abuses are by no means universal, accounts of such behavior have 
occurred with sufficient frequency to warrant this inquiry. 
  introduction
ICE raid in Santa Ana, California.  © AP/Mark Avery
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this report is the first public document to collect and analyze the available evidence regarding the 
prevalence of constitutional violations occurring during iCe home raids.  in addition to assessing the 
home raid incidents discussed in various news accounts and legal filings, this report relies upon the 
special perspective of local law enforcement and political leaders, and for the first time examines iCe’s 
own records for empirical evidence of the prevalence of violations occurring during iCe home raids.  
section ii presents a practical and legal overview of iCe’s home raid strategy.  section iii compiles 
and analyzes evidence regarding the prevalence of constitutional violations occurring during iCe 
home raids.  section iV analyzes the causes and costs of the problems with iCe’s home raid 
strategy.  Finally, section V sets forth a series of policy recommendations designed to curb the 
widespread constitutional violations occurring during iCe home raids.  these policy proposals 
were developed, in large part, in collaboration with a Law enforcement Advisory Panel assembled 
for this report.  the Advisory Panel, chaired by nassau County Police Commissioner Lawrence W. 
Mulvey, is comprised of law enforcement leaders and scholars from across the united states.  the 
Advisory Panel played a critical role in reviewing the report findings and in developing these specific 
policy proposals for iCe to ensure that its officers comply with constitutional requirements when 
conducting home raids.
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Within iCe, there are two major divisions that carry out its interior immigration enforcement mandate: the office of Detention and Removal (DRo), which primarily seeks to identify and arrest immigrants for civil immigration violations, and the office 
of investigations (oi), primarily a criminal investigative division of iCe,6 tasked with investigating 
national security threats, financial and smuggling violations, gang offenses, commercial fraud, and 
other immigration violations.7  Both DRo and oi regularly use home raids.  
ICe HOMe RAId OPeRAtIOns
several DRo and oi operations have, since 2006, come to rely heavily on home raids as a primary 
tactic.  these operations include, among others, the national Fugitive operations Program 
(nFoP), targeting individuals with orders of deportation; operation Cross Check, encompassing 
enforcement efforts that target specific immigrant populations, such as immigrants from certain 
countries or immigrants working in certain industries;8 operation Community shield, targeting 
immigrant gang members; and operation Predator, targeting immigrant sex offenders.  Despite 
these operations’ purported focus on high priority 
targets, the evidence demonstrates that the large 
majority of arrests made in home raids carried 
out under these operations are not of high priority 
targets but rather are collateral arrests of mere civil 
immigration status violators.9  
iCe’s nFoP is worthy of further explanation because 
of its size and because of the publicity its home raid 
operations have garnered.  iCe created the nFoP, 
within DRo, in 2003.10  nFoP uses seven-person 
Fugitive operations teams (Fots) to carry out the 
Program’s mission.  the stated purpose of these 
teams is to expand the agency’s efforts to locate, 
arrest and remove immigrants with old orders of 
deportation,11 while giving priority to cases involving immigrants who pose a threat to national 
security and to the community.  in 2006, iCe instituted several dramatic policy changes related 
to its Fots which, collectively, help explain iCe’s increased reliance on home raid operations and 
the constitutional violations occurring during such operations.  the policy changes inflated the 
arrest expectations for Fots eight-fold, while simultaneously removing a requirement that Fots 
focus on “criminal aliens,” and for the first time permitting Fots to count collateral arrests of 
civil status violators toward their inflated arrest expectations. the impact of iCe’s 2006 revised 
performance expectations is discussed in detail later in this report.12  over the course of time, the 
number of Fots increased as well; while the nFoP started with eight Fots, today there are over 
100 teams.13 Given the size of the nFoP and its primary reliance upon home raids, the behavior 
of Fots are of particular importance in assessing iCe’s home raid strategy.  
 overview of ice home rAids strAtegy
despite these operations’ 
purported focus on high 
priority targets, the evidence 
demonstrates that the large 
majority of arrests made in 
home raids carried out under 
these operations are not 
of high priority targets but 
rather are collateral arrests of 
mere civil immigration status 
violators.9  
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COnstItutIOnAL RequIReMents fOR ICe HOMe RAIds
the supreme Court has held that “physical entry of a home is the chief evil against which the wording 
of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”14 in the absence of consent from an adult resident,15 or exigent 
circumstances,16 a search conducted without a judicial warrant issued by an impartial magistrate17 is 
presumed to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.  Administrative warrants 
do not authorize agents to enter homes without consent because they are not issued by impartial 
magistrates.18  outside of the home, government agents are generally empowered to make warrantless 
arrests when they have probable cause to believe an individual has committed an arrestable offense.19 
However, even where probable cause exists to make an arrest, government agents may not enter a 
home without a judicial warrant.  the nature of the arrest  —  criminal vs. civil-immigration  —  has 
no bearing on the constitutional protections applied to the home.20  
in addition, the Fourth Amendment restricts the power of police to seize people for investigatory 
purposes or to search a home without consent.  the Constitution requires that an officer have 
“reasonable suspicion” that an individual is engaged in unlawful activity before the officer can 
seize the person, even for brief questioning,21 and generally requires a judicial warrant to search 
a home.22 there is an exception to this rule when 
an officer, lawfully present inside a home, needs 
to search the home or briefly seize an individual 
to ensure the safety of the officer.23  in addition, 
agents can never rely solely on the racial or ethnic 
appearance or the limited english proficiency of an 
individual to justify a seizure.24 
these constitutional requirements should govern 
iCe’s conduct in home raids.  When an iCe agent 
enters a home without consent, armed only with an 
administrative warrant, it is a constitutional violation 
that goes to the heart of the Fourth Amendment. 
Further, even if an iCe agent is lawfully in a dwelling, he generally violates the Constitution if he 
searches the home without consent (or beyond the scope of the consent) or if he seizes an occupant 
without a reasonable suspicion that the individual is engaged in unlawful conduct.  
ICe POLICIes GOveRnInG HOMe RAIds
DHs’s own regulations and policies incorporate the constitutional requirements set forth above. 
During home raids, iCe agents are generally armed only with administrative arrest warrants issued by 
an immigration official, rather than judicial search or arrest warrants issued by a neutral judge.25  these 
administrative warrants do not require a showing of probable cause, as in the case of judicial warrants.26 
According to iCe’s own Detention and Deportation officer’s Field Manual, “Warrants of Deportation 
and Removal are administrative rather than criminal, and do not grant the authority to breach doors. 
thus informed consent must be obtained from the occupant of the residence prior to entering.”27  
these constitutional 
requirements should govern 
ice’s conduct in home raids.  
when an ice agent enters a 
home without consent, armed 
only with an administrative 
warrant, it is a constitutional 
violation that goes to the heart 
of the fourth Amendment. 
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Accordingly, when targeting residences, both DRo and oi agents are supposed to follow similar 
mandatory “knock-and-talk” procedures laid out in official iCe manuals.28  the Field Manual 
explains that “officers can knock on a door and request to speak with the occupants of the 
house without first obtaining a search warrant.  However, in order to enter a residence, someone 
who has authority to do so must grant informed consent, unless a court-approved search warrant 
is obtained in advance.”29  
if consent is given, iCe agents are permitted to enter the home and ask questions regarding 
the location of the intended target.30 if agents encounter other people in the home, agents are 
permitted to seek consent to ask questions regarding immigration status.31 However, agents may 
not detain the occupants for questioning unless they have a “reasonable suspicion, based on 
specific articulable facts, that the person being questioned . . .  is an alien illegally in the united 
states.”32 if, after lawful questioning, agents develop a reason to believe that an individual is in 
the united states illegally, they can arrest them without a warrant and transport them to the local 
immigration processing center.33
iCe agents are also permitted to request consent to search the residence, or a portion of it.34  But 
agents are “not permitted to search portions of the premises other than those for which consent 
to search has been given,” and have been “instructed that consent to remain in the house and to 
search can be revoked at any time.”35 the only exception to this general rule is when iCe agents 
have “reasonable suspicion that the premises harbor a person who poses a danger to the agents” 
—  in which case the agents are permitted to conduct a protective sweep.36  However, “agents 
have been instructed that any protective sweep [can] extend only to areas in which the potentially 
dangerous person(s) could be hiding.”37 
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in recent years, individual accounts from across the country demonstrate a suspiciously uniform pattern of constitutional violations during iCe home raids. these accounts are documented in civil law suits, suppression motions in immigration proceedings, and local and national media 
coverage.  these narratives show a trend that establishes three distinct types of conduct which violate 
the Fourth amendment: entering and searching homes without warrants, exigency or consent, and 
then seizing residents without reasonable suspicion.  the pattern which emerges from the individual 
narratives is supported by the observations and statements of local political and law enforcement 
leaders, who have a unique vantage point to view iCe misconduct in their communities.  Finally, this 
report examines empirical data drawn from iCe’s own arrest records from two separate iCe field 
offices and publicly available suppression motion data.  Collectively, the evidence strongly suggests a 
significant and disturbing pattern of iCe misconduct during home raids.  
eMPIRICAL evIdenCe
data from ICe Arrest Records 
iCe regulations, which carry the force of law, require that:
An immigration officer may not enter into . . .  a residence . . .  unless the officer has 
either a warrant or the consent of the owner or other person in control of the site to 
be inspected. When consent to enter is given, the immigration officer must note on the 
officer’s report that consent was given and, if possible, by whom consent was given.38
Accordingly, review of iCe arrest reports should reveal whether or not consent was obtained prior 
to the entrance of iCe agents into a residence.  since iCe does not obtain judicial warrants for 
its home raids, entering a home without consent is a violation of the Fourth Amendment of the 
Constitution.  
two data sets of iCe arrest records were reviewed in preparation for this report to examine 
whether, among other things, consent was noted on the arrest records.  the first data set was 
obtained pursuant to a Freedom of information Act (FoiA) lawsuit and included arrest records 
from home raid operations in nassau and suffolk County, new York between January 1, 2006 
and April 18, 2008 (hereinafter “Long island data set”).  this data set included the iCe arrest 
records related to 100 randomly selected individuals arrested in home raids out of the total of 
457 such arrests during this period.39  the second 
data set was also obtained through a FoiA lawsuit 
and included 600 electronically available arrest 
reports from home raid operations conducted 
by the newark, new Jersey iCe office and the 
Central new Jersey iCe office on certain dates 
between February 22, 2006 and December 7, 2007 
(hereinafter the “new Jersey data set”).40  
 the prevAlence of constitutionAl violAtions  
 during ice home rAids:  Assessing the evidence
ice agents from the new york 
and new Jersey field offices 
failed to obtain lawful consent 
to enter homes in violation 
of the constitution in a large 
percentage of cases. 
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the data from both sets reveal several alarming trends.  As 
set forth in Figures 1 & 2, based on the assumption that iCe 
is following its own legal requirements regarding notation of 
consent, and based upon iCe’s public statements that it does 
not obtain judicial warrants in home raid operations, both data 
sets demonstrate that iCe agents from the new York and new 
Jersey Field offices failed to obtain lawful consent to enter homes 
in violation of the Constitution in a large percentage of cases. 
interestingly, the data from the two data sets show significantly 
different rates of illegal entries by iCe agents during home raids. 
there are several possible explanations for the difference.  the two 
data sets involve iCe agents from different field offices.  it is possible 
that the supervision, training, and culture of the iCe offices are 
sufficiently different to account for the marked difference in the rate 
of illegal entries during home raids.  it is also possible, that record 
keeping practices vary between the offices such that the new York 
office may be failing to note consent in some instances when it 
is actually obtained and/or the new Jersey office may be noting 
consent in some instances when it is not actually obtained.    
indeed, there are some indications that the officers from 
the new Jersey Field offices are, in some instances, either fabricating consent in their reports or 
misunderstanding the legal requirements of consent.  For example, in one arrest record from the 
new Jersey data set, an officer notes that “[t]he newark Fugitive operation team . . .  gained access 
into apartment [redacted] by way of knocking, thus the door was opened from the intensity of the 
banging.  upon slowly entering the apartment at [redacted] i noticed that [redacted] was approaching 
the doorway.”  the same arrest report incorrectly states: “Gained Access to home via: subject gave 
consent” — apparently boilerplate language that appeared in many new Jersey arrest records. 
Moreover, in a handful of cases from the new Jersey data set, we were able to match arrest records that 
noted consent, with detailed eyewitness accounts of those raids, which contradicted the arrest records 
accounts of consent.  even if the new Jersey arrest reports are taken at face value, it is possible that 
the new Jersey data was skewed in iCe’s favor since, unlike the new York data, the new Jersey arrest 
records were not randomly drawn.  
Whatever the cause of the divergence 
between the two data sets, they share 
one crucial trait: they both evince an 
unacceptable level of illegal entries 
by iCe agents during home raid 
operations in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  if this data were the 
only evidence of such illegal entries it 
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[t]he high percentage of collateral 
arrests is consistent with allegations 
that ice agents are using home raids for 
purported targets as a pretext to enter 
homes and illegally seize mere civil 
immigration violators, in order to meet 
inflated arrest expectations.41
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might be possible to discount these statistics as record keeping failures. 
However, when placed in the context of the other evidence set forth 
below, these arrest records serve to confirm the widespread nature of 
the violations occurring in the new York and new Jersey field offices.    
Figures 3 & 4 break out the percentage of target arrests versus collateral 
arrests of civil immigration violators made in each home raid data set. 
Both data sets demonstrate that the large majority of home raid arrests 
from the new Jersey and new York Field offices do not involve the 
purported targets of the operations.  this data is instructive because 
the high percentage of collateral arrests is consistent with allegations 
that iCe agents are using home raids for purported targets as a pretext 
to enter homes and illegally seize mere civil immigration violators, in 
order to meet inflated arrest expectations.41 
Here, the data is notably consistent between the two data sets, showing 
that only approximately one-third of all home raid arrests are of targets. 
the remaining two-thirds of the arrests are of civil immigration violators 
who iCe happens to encounter during home raid operations.  
A review of the arrest records also demonstrated that, notwithstanding the legal requirement that 
iCe has some reasonable suspicion before it detains and questions individuals, the large majority 
of arrest reports articulated no basis for the initial seizure.  
Again, the data is extremely consistent and suggestive of widespread Fourth Amendment violations by 
agents from the new Jersey and new York 
Field offices.  While, unlike the consent 
data, there are no regulations specifically 
requiring iCe agents to note the basis 
for their initial stop, such information is 
precisely what one would expect to find in 
an arrest report. Further, the fact that such 
information is included in approximately 
one-third of such reports, suggests that 
iCe agents are trained to include the 
information.
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Finally, the data also revealed a disturbing 
trend suggestive of racial profiling by iCe 
agents during home raid operations by the 
new Jersey and new York Field offices. 
specifically, the data demonstrates that 
Latinos are significantly overrepresented 
in collateral arrests by iCe agents during 
home raids.  Figure 7 below compares the 
percentage of Latinos arrested as targets with 
the percentage of Latinos arrested as collaterals in both data sets.
Presumably, the ethnicities of the targets iCe seeks is a good indicator of the ethnic compositions 
of the immigrant communities in which iCe operations take place.  Accordingly, it is difficult to 
explain why significantly more Latinos (21% more in new Jersey and 28% more in Long island) are 
arrested as collaterals than as targets during home raid operations.  indeed, in both jurisdictions, 
the vast majority of collateral arrest records where iCe officers did not note any basis for seizing and 
questioning the individual were of Latino subjects  —  90% in new Jersey and 94% in Long island. 
this data lends empirical support to the community complaints that during home raids iCe agents 
seize Latino residents based simply on their ethnic appearance or limited english proficiency.  
this arrest data raises profound concerns over the 
constitutionality of iCe’s home raid operations.  the data 
is, of course, limited to two jurisdictions and it is possible 
that data from other jurisdictions could vary.  However, 
the consistency of the new Jersey and Long island data 
on most points, at minimum, raises the possibility of an 
agency-wide problem.  it is difficult to imagine why the 
problems identified in these jurisdiction would be any 
less prevalent in iCe operations elsewhere.  the data 
on the rate of illegal entries is the exception  —  since 
it varied dramatically between the two jurisdictions. 
this is certainly worthy of further investigation, though 
it is important to remember that even the “better” 
jurisdiction still showed officers illegally entering homes 
in one quarter of home raids.  
suppression Motion data
the increasing prevalence in recent years of suppression motions being brought in removal 
proceedings, alleging constitutional violations by iCe officers is another indication of the widespread 
practice of illegal home entries during iCe operations. to be sure, not all such motions are 
reflective of an actual underlying constitutional violation.  However, in immigration court, unlike in 
criminal court, suppression motions are not a standard part of removal defense practice  —  many 
[t]he data also revealed a 
disturbing trend suggestive of 
racial profiling ... specifically, the 
data demonstrates that latinos 
are significantly overrepresented 
in collateral arrests by ice agents 
during home raids.  
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immigration attorneys will go their entire career without filing a suppression motion.  Accordingly, 
the statistics set forth below demonstrating a sharp increase in the filing of such motions after 
iCe expanded its home raid operation in 2006 is one more indication of the widespread Fourth 
Amendment violations occurring during iCe home raid operations. 
suppression motions are rarely brought in immigration court, in part because in 1984 the supreme 
Court ruled that, since deportation proceedings are civil, not criminal, respondents are not generally 
entitled to suppression even when evidence was obtained in violation of the Constitution.42 However, the 
supreme Court also reasoned that the exclusionary rule may be available in immigration proceedings 
for egregious or widespread Fourth Amendment violations, and lower courts and the immigration 
courts have subsequently recognized egregious constitutional violations as a basis for suppression.43 
nevertheless, suppression motions remain extremely difficult to win in immigration proceedings, as they 
are very labor intensive, require Respondents to meet a high legal standard, and are often mooted out by 
evidence obtained independent of the constitutional violation.44  Moreover, in most deportation cases 
iCe does not need to rely upon evidence it gathered during an arrest.  therefore, even if a respondent 
in a deportation proceeding can prove an egregious constitutional violation, it is uncommon that a 
suppression motion can alter the outcome of a deportation proceeding.  Accordingly, in most cases 
suppression motions, even if meritorious, are futile and therefore will not be filed.  
in preparation for this report, a Freedom of information Act request was filed with the executive office 
for immigration Review  —  the agency which oversees the federal immigration courts  —  seeking 
statistics on the prevalence and outcomes of suppression motions.  unfortunately, the agency does 
not track such data and was thus unable to substantively respond to the request.  As a result, the best 
available data on the prevalence, outcome, and type of suppression motions being filed in immigration 
court is the on-line database which compiles opinions from the Board of immigration Appeals (BiA)  — 
the administrative court that reviews immigration judge 
decisions.45  this database does not, however, contain 
all agency decisions related to suppression motion. 
the database only contains published BiA decisions 
and selected unpublished BiA decisions, and does not 
contain any immigration court decisions  —  where we 
would expect to find the majority of decisions discussing 
suppression motions.  Accordingly, the data set forth 
below significantly under-represents the prevalence 
of suppression motions.  However, the data remains 
instructive, not in regard to the raw numbers, but rather 
in regard to the trends demonstrated by the prevalence, 
types, and outcomes of suppression motions. 
Comparing the period between 2006, when iCe 
instituted its new arrest performance expectations 
and vastly expanded its home raid operations, and 
June 2009, to an equal period of time immediately 
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preceding 2006, we looked at three variables:  (1) 
the number of suppression motions filed, (2) the 
number of suppression motions involving home 
raids, and (3) the number of suppression motions 
granted.  Figure 8 compares the raw numbers in 
each category between the periods before and after 
the 2006 policy changes and the expansion of iCe’s 
home raid campaign. 
Again, the raw numbers are not particularly 
instructive because of the limitations in the data set 
discussed above.  However, the trends are noteworthy.  since 2006, there has been a nine-fold 
increase in the filing of suppression motions, a twenty-two-fold increase in suppression motions 
related to home raids, and a five-fold increase in the grant rate of suppression motions.  
While the data set of recent suppression motions is far from complete, the significant uptick in the 
filing of suppression motions is one more indicator of a pattern of illegality arising out of, among 
other things, iCe’s home raid campaign.  together, the arrest report and suppression motion data 
appear to demonstrate a significant pattern of constitutional violations occurring during iCe home 
raid operations in new York and new Jersey and are suggestive of a national pattern.  
LAW enfORCeMent And POLItICAL LeAdeRs’ ACCOunts Of ICe HOMe RAIds 
Concern over the prevalence of Fourth Amendment violations during iCe home raids reaches well 
beyond the immigrant communities targeted by iCe.  Law enforcement and political leaders have 
voiced serious concerns specifically regarding iCe’s violations of the Fourth Amendment, and more 
generally about how, because of local cooperation with iCe, iCe’s conduct threatens to undermine the 
central crime suppression mission of local police departments.46 
iCe will often request support for home raid operations from local police departments, usually in 
the form of having a marked local police car accompany iCe agents to target residences. Apparently, 
iCe’s theory is that when they bang on the door of a residence and shout “police,” as is standard 
in home raids, residents are more likely to open their doors if they see a local police car outside 
and, therefore, do not suspect an immigration raid.  the 
fear of some local police leaders is that, to the extent local 
police are perceived as working with immigration agents, 
particularly when iCe agents are illegally entering homes, 
immigrant residents will be less likely to cooperate with 
police on criminal matters.47  such residents may be less 
likely to come forward as witnesses and victims of crimes, 
may be reluctant to call for police assistance in domestic 
violence situations, and may be less likely to open their 
doors for police officers.48  
since 2006, there has been 
a nine-fold increase in the 
filing of suppression motions, 
a twenty-two-fold increase in 
suppression motions related 
to home raids, and a five-fold 
increase in the grant rate of 
suppression motions.  
“[immigration raids] break 
up families . . . just kick[ing] 
down the door in the 
middle of the night, taking 
[a] father, a parent away, 
that’s just not the American 
way.  it must stop.”46 
– Rep. nancy Pelosi (d-CA),  
speaker of the House of Representatives
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“i have been appalled by 
some of the practices i 
have heard about and i 
would like to work with 
your department to end 
the practice of allowing 
immigration officers to 
forcefully enter people’s 
homes with nothing more 
than an administrative 
warrant, and incarcerate 
anyone that can not 
immediately produce their 
immigration papers.”46
– sen. kirstin Gillibrand (d-ny)
two home raid operations have drawn particularly vocal 
responses from police and political leaders.  in June 2007, 
iCe conducted a series of home raids in new Haven, 
Connecticut just two days after the city had adopted a 
municipal identification law that allowed all residents, 
including undocumented residents, to obtain government 
issued identification.  Much of the criticism of those raids 
centered on suspicion that the raids were carried out in 
retaliation for the city’s municipal identification policy, 
which is in tension with federal policy.  However, political 
leaders also drew attention to the repeated accounts of 
how iCe agents pushed their way into homes, in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment.49  new Haven’s Mayor John 
Destefano described a “very aggressive intervention” by 
iCe agents who “pushed into homes without warrants.”50 
senators Christopher Dodd and Joseph Lieberman, along 
with Congresswoman Rosa DeLauro wrote a formal letter 
to then-secretary of DHs Michael Chertoff requesting an explanation for the repeated accounts of iCe 
agents illegally entering homes.51  secretary Chertoff replied by affirming that the agents possessed 
only administrative arrest warrants that did not authorize them to enter homes without consent but 
he asserted that iCe obtained consent to enter all of the homes.52  
it is also noteworthy that during the new Haven operation iCe agents failed to apprehend the large 
majority of targets, instead, consistent with the empirical data above, focusing on collateral arrests. the 
new Haven operation was part of the national Fugitive operation Program.  iCe was seeking to arrest 
sixteen target “fugitives” but ultimately arrested thirty-one individuals, only four of whom were targets 
of the raid  —  the rest were collateral arrests of undocumented immigrants encountered at the target 
residences.53  the large percentage of collateral arrests and the fact that most of the arrestees were 
Latino, led Mayor Destefano to raise concerns over potential racial profiling  —  a concern that senator 
Dodd said warranted further investigation.54 “We won’t stand for the violation of constitutional rights 
and racial profiling in new Haven” said Mayor John Destefano in reaction to the raids.55 
several months later, in september 2007, a large-scale home raid operation in Long island, new York 
sparked similar allegations of illegality from police and political leaders in nassau County.56  this 
time, the raids were coordinated by iCe’s office of investigation under its operation Community 
shield. nassau County Police Department initially agreed to a request by iCe to assist in the multi-
day operation by detailing officers in marked units to accompany each iCe team.57  However, two 
days into the operation, nassau County Police pulled out of the operation because of “serious 
allegations of misconduct and malfeasance.”58  iCe sought ninety-six target individuals59 who were 
believed to be deportable members of violent gangs living in nassau County.  After three days of 
raids, iCe arrested only six targets and again the vast majority of arrests  —  ninety-five to be precise 
— were collateral arrests for civil immigration violations.60  
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nassau County Police Commissioner, Lawrence 
Mulvey, and nassau County executive thomas 
suozzi both spoke out about a range of misconduct 
by iCe agents during the raids.  nassau County 
executive suozzi’s letter to DHs secretary Chertoff 
condemned “tactical actions which cross the lines 
of legality and law enforcement best practices,” 
and asked secretary Chertoff to look into the 
allegations that arose out of the nassau County 
home raids.61  Commissioner Mulvey relayed 
accounts from his officers of excess shows of force 
by iCe agents, undisciplined law enforcement 
tactics, and deplorable intelligence that resulted 
in iCe targeting incorrect residences in over 90% 
of the raids. 62  
iCe later revealed that iCe did not posses any warrants, not even administrative warrants, for the 
targets in the nassau County Community shield operation.63  However, DHs again claimed that 
it received consent to enter all of the homes it targeted during the nassau Community shield 
operation.64  in response to this claim, Commissioner Mulvey commented that “in my 29 years 
of police work, i have executed countless warrants and have sought consent to enter countless 
homes.  iCe’s claim that they received 100% compliance with their requests to enter is not credible 
even under the best of circumstances.”65  
obviously these two highly publicized incidents of political and police leaders criticizing iCe’s 
home raid operations do not alone evince a nationwide problem.  However, taken in the context of 
similar statements from other political and law enforcement leaders,66 these highly unusual public 
conflicts between law enforcement agencies over police tactics lend credibility and color to the 
empirical evidence set forth above and anecdotal evidence set forth below.  
unIfORM nAtIOnAL PAtteRn Of COnstItutIOnAL vIOLAtIOns 
duRInG ICe HOMe RAIds
since 2006, when iCe vastly expanded its home raid operations, lawsuits have been filed in every 
region of the country  —  including two large class actions, and several lawsuits that include 
multiple defendants  —  all alleging a similar pattern of iCe misconduct.  the accounts of iCe 
conduct in these lawsuits together with similar accounts in suppression motions in immigration 
court and in news reports evince a suspiciously uniform pattern of misconduct.  
one common theme that emerges from the lawsuits, suppression motions, and news accounts 
is iCe officers’ pattern of illegally entering residences. there is story after story of iCe agents, 
armed with only an administrative warrant, yelling and banging on doors and then forcing their 
way into homes in the pre-dawn hours by pushing their way in if residents unlock their doors, and 
“in my 29 years of police 
work, i have executed 
countless warrants and have 
sought consent to enter 
countless homes.  ice’s 
claim that they received 
100% compliance with their 
requests to enter is not 
credible even under the best  
of circumstances.”65 
– Commissioner Lawrence Mulvey, 
nassau County Police department  
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otherwise climbing through windows or kicking in doors. some residents report being awakened by 
the presence of armed iCe officers in their bedrooms who illegally gained entry through unlocked 
doors. once inside the homes, the lawsuits, suppression motions and news accounts all tell a 
similar story of iCe agents abandoning focus 
on a purported target and instead immediately 
seizing and questioning all occupants about their 
immigration status regardless of any legal basis 
to do so. the picture that emerges is that once 
iCe agents immediately detain all occupants, 
they generally conduct an illegal non-consensual 
search of the premises67 looking for evidence of the 
occupants’ immigration status  —  or lack thereof. 
Below are various accounts from across the country 
of this pattern of iCe misconduct:
March 2009, in Arizona, Jimmy Slaughter, himself 
a DHS officer, filed suit against ICE for raiding 
his home: “I was at home with my wife when the 
door bell rang.  I opened the door and noticed 
approximately 7 uniformed ICE agents with vests 
and guns standing at my door . . .  I opened the 
door to look at the paperwork and five agents entered my house. . . . The agents then told my 
wife to stand in the center of ‘OUR’ living room.  Not once did anyone say they had a warrant.” 
Slaughter v. Department of Homeland Security (D.A.Z.) (slaughters Aff., February 13, 2009).
september 2008, in Texas, “The 68-year-old woman told Action 4 News that she heard a knock 
at her door Tuesday morning.  But before she had a chance to get up she said U.S. Immigration 
& Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents were inside her home . . .  When she asked them why 
they came into her home they allegedly responded, ‘Show us your papers.’  Savage complied 
by showing them documentation proving that she’s been a United States citizen for 40 years.” 
Jackie Diaz, Call 4 Action: Mistaken Immigration Raid?, Valleycentral.com (sept. 30, 2008).
March 2008, in California, ICE agents came to the home of an immigration attorney, looking 
for another person; when the attorney closed his door and asked them to leave the premises 
because they could not produce a search warrant, the agents threatened to break his door 
down.  sandra Hernandez, ICE Increases Use of Home Raids, Daily Journal (Mar. 26, 2008).
January 2008, in North Bergen, NJ, a tenant opened her door and ICE agents searched the entire 
apartment without permission or legal justification. The tenant was arrested notwithstanding 
the fact that she had recently been granted legal immigration status and had documents proving 
that her official work permit card would soon be coming.  Argueta v. Myers, no. 08-cv-01652 (D. 
nJ) (complaint filed Apr. 3, 2008).
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 Jimmy Slaughter, himself a DHS 
officer, filed suit against ICE for 
raiding his home: “I was at home 
with my wife when the door bell 
rang.  I opened the door and noticed 
approximately 7 uniformed ICE 
agents with vests and guns standing 
at my door . . .  I opened the door to 
look at the paperwork and five agents 
entered my house . . . . The agents then 
told my wife to stand in the center 
of ‘OUR’ living room.  Not once did 
anyone say they had a warrant.”  
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december 2007, in Massachusetts, “eight to 10 ICE agents, with guns drawn, broke through the 
door of the three-family apartment building at 21 Jefferson St. about 5 a.m. Friday. ‘They came 
through and shined flashlights in people’s faces. They went into each room, they told everyone to 
lie down on the floor, they say not to move,’ he said. ‘They checked everyone’s papers. They took 
everybody.’” Evidence of ICE’s illegal search included “shards of the broken door frame they say 
ICE agents kicked through. A safe in one room lay open, its papers strewn all about. The men 
also showed the reporter another bedroom door they said ICE agents had kicked open.”  Aaron 
nicodemus, Illegal Aliens Arrested in Raid: Feds Nab 15 in Milford, telegram & gazette (Dec. 9, 2007)
december 2007, in Newark, NJ, between 5:30am and 6:00am, there was loud pounding on the 
door. Believing it was another tenant who was locked out, a resident opened the door to find six 
ICE agents displaying holstered firearms. The officers forced the door to stay open and detained 
the resident without a warrant, probable cause, exigent circumstances, or a reasonable basis for 
believing that he was unlawfully present in the United States. Argueta v. Myers, no. 08-cv-01652 
(D. nJ) (complaint filed Apr. 3, 2008).
september 2007, in Passaic County, NJ, around 5:30am, around nine ICE agents forced their 
way illegally into a home after someone inside opened the door to see who was banging on the 
door. The ICE agents illegally searched the home and stopped everyone from leaving. Argueta 
v. Myers, no. 08-cv-01652 (D. nJ) (complaint filed Apr. 3, 2008).
August 2007, in Hudson County, NJ, at 6:30am, 
ICE agents did not identify themselves while 
banging on the door. When a tenant opened 
the door to see who was outside, the ICE 
agents forced their way inside illegally, and 
illegally interrogated people in their home. One 
resident was forcibly stopped from calling her 
attorney. Argueta v. Myers, no. 08-cv-01652 (D. 
nJ) (complaint filed Apr. 3, 2008).
July 2007, in Staten Island, NY, in finding the 
ICE agents’ conduct during a  5:30am  home 
raid unconstitutional, one Immigration Judge 
wrote “Respondent persuasively argues that 
an egregious violation that was fundamentally 
unfair occurred during his arrest. . . .  ICE agents 
used excessive force while searching his home 
. . .  ICE agents entered his home and his private 
bedroom in the early hours of the morning armed 
with pistols.  They forced him into the hall and 
required him to stand in his underwear before 
his brother, sister-in-law and their children. . . . 
“Respondent persuasively argues 
that an egregious violation that was 
fundamentally unfair occurred during 
his arrest. . . . ICE agents used excessive 
force while searching his home . . . 
ICE agents entered his home and his 
private bedroom in the early hours of 
the morning armed with pistols.  They 
forced him into the hall and required 
him to stand in his underwear before his 
brother, sister-in-law and their children. 
. . . ICE agents refused to produce a 
warrant or identify the person they 
claimed to be seeking.  Finally, they tied 
a plastic cord around the Respondents 
wrists as handcuffs and forced him 
to accompany them to their office in 
Manhattan.” 
– Immigration Judge vivienna Gordon-uruakpa, 
new york Immigration Court
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ICE agents refused to produce a warrant or identify the person they claimed to be seeking.  Finally, 
they tied a plastic cord around the Respondents wrists as handcuffs and forced him to accompany 
them to their office in Manhattan.”  In the Matter of R-B-, (new York, n.Y., immigr. Ct., May 28, 2009). 
June 2007, in New Haven, CT, in finding the ICE agents’ conduct during a 6:30am home 
raid unconstitutional, one Immigration Judge wrote “Respondent’s roommate testified that 
he opened the door ajar a few inches.  Without saying a word, agents immediately and forcibly 
pushed the door wide open.  Respondent’s roommate did not consent to their entry and DHS 
concedes they had no warrant. . . .  The agents’ unlawful early morning entry into a private 
residence strongly implicates “unreasonable” unlawful conduct.” In the Matter of Y-, (Hartford, 
Ct immigr. Ct. June 2, 2009).
June 2007, in New Haven, CT, in finding the ICE agents’ conduct unconstitutional, one Immigration 
Judge wrote “immigration agents forcefully entered a private home without a warrant, without 
probable cause, and without consent. . . .  Mr. [redacted] opened the door ajar a few inches.  Agents 
immediately and forcibly pushed the door wide open, requiring Mr. [redacted] to step back and 
avoid being hit by the door.  Mr. [redacted] did not consent to their entry and DHS concedes that 
they had no warrant to enter the home.”  In the Matter of X-, (Hartford, Ct immigr. Ct. June 1, 2009).
June 2007, in Connecticut, the Office of the Mayor of New Haven issued a press release following 
the highly publicized raids there, which explained how “federal agents [were] pushing their 
way into houses, brusquely ordering men, women and children to common areas, and leading 
family members and loved ones away in handcuffs.”  Press Release, office of the Mayor of new 
Haven, Connecticut, June 6, 2007.  
June 2007, in Morris County, NJ, at 6:45am, ICE 
agents took out their guns, banged on a door, 
and forced their way in once the tenant opened 
the door to find out who was there. ICE agents 
illegally entered and searched the home. An ICE 
agent yelled at one of the residents who tried to call 
her lawyer. The ICE agent used abusive language 
– yelling “F*** you” and “You are a piece of s***.” 
Argueta v. Myers, no. 08-cv-01652 (D. nJ) (complaint 
filed Apr. 3, 2008).
April 2007, in Long Island, NY, in finding the 
ICE agents’ conduct unconstitutional, one 
Immigration Judge wrote, “It is hard for me to 
fathom a country or a place in which we live in 
which the Government can barge into one’s house 
without authority from the Third Branch after a 
probable cause finding. So for all these reasons I 
“It is hard for me to fathom a 
country or a place in which we 
live in which the Government can 
barge into one’s house without 
authority from the Third Branch 
after a probable cause finding. So 
for all these reasons I find that 
what is essentially a warrantless 
search in the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment .. .  was an 
egregious violation, and therefore I 
suppress all the evidence and order 
these proceedings terminated.” 
– Immigration Judge noel Brennan,  
new york Immigration Court.
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find that what is essentially a warrantless search in the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 
meaning that the entry without a judicially authorized warrant on April 18 was an egregious 
violation, and therefore I suppress all the evidence and order these proceedings terminated.” 
Matter of P-M- (new York, n.Y., immigr. Ct., May 13, 2008)
April 2007, in Minnesota, the news reported that ICE agents showed up wearing bulletproof vests 
and armed with guns.  They pushed their way into homes and terrified the children.  shannon 
Prather, Immigration Raids, Arrests Trigger Lawsuits, St. Paul Pioneer PreSS (Apr. 19, 2007).  
April 2007, in Willmar, MN, “Defendants conducted these warrantless home searches by 
going to Plaintiffs’ doors and knocking loudly on the doors. When asked by Plaintiffs to identify 
themselves, Defendant ICE agents would falsely claim ‘It’s the Police.’. . . When Plaintiffs would 
open their doors slightly to confirm that it was the police, Defendant ICE agents would force 
open the door and push their way into Plaintiffs’ homes all without any knowing or voluntary 
consent of Plaintiffs to allow the ICE agents inside their homes.” Arias v. ICE, no. 07-01959 (D. 
Minn. filed April 19, 2007).
April 2007, in Riverhead, NY, Residents were awakened by loud voices yelling “Police! Open the 
door!” and the sounds of windows and doors being forced open.  When one resident entered 
his kitchen he found an ICE agent climbing through an unlocked window. With one leg inside 
the home, the armed agent yelled, “Open the f****** door!” When the resident unlocked the 
door, other agents stormed into the residence.  Once inside, ICE agents immediately cuffed all 
residents, kicked in an interior door, and rifled through dresser drawers without consent, looking 
for immigration documents. Matter of I-, (new York, n.Y., immigr. Ct.,) (on file with author).
March 2007, in California, “[ICE Agents] arrived at [the Reyes’ home] in the early morning 
hours…Armed and wearing clothes bearing the word “police,” [ICE Agents] entered the 
residence and demanded the immigration papers and passports of [7 year old] Kebin and his 
father. . . [ICE Agents] did not have lawful authorization or a valid warrant for entering the 
home. . . Despite being placed on notice that Kebin is a United States citizen, [Agents] instructed 
his father to waken Kebin because they were going to seize him as well . . . [Agents] took Kebin 
and his father to an ICE office in San Francisco and held them there against their will.”  Reyes 
v. Alcantar, no. 07-02271 (n.D. Cal., filed Apr. 26, 2007).
March 2007, in Paterson, NJ, at around 4:00am, a lawful permanent resident was awakened 
by shouts of “Paterson Police.” The tenant opened the door to ask for a warrant and ICE agents 
illegally forced their way into the house and searched it without consent, permission, or legal 
justification. Argueta v. Myers, no. 08-cv-01652 (D. nJ) (complaint filed Apr. 3, 2008).
february 2007, in East Hampton, NY, “Armed ICE agents kicked in the door of [Nelly’s] home 
. . . between 4:00 and 5:00 a.m.  The ICE agents forcibly entered her home without a search 
warrant, consent, or any exigent circumstances.”  Aguilar v. ICE, no. 07-1819 (s.D.n.Y.) (complaint 
filed sep. 20, 2007).
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february 2007, in East Hampton, NY, “The ICE agents pulled covers off of [Adriana’s] bed 
and shone flashlights into her face and the face of her son, who began to cry.  The ICE agents 
searched the Aguilar/Leon family home without the consent of the Leon or Aguilar families. 
[A]driana asked the ICE agents to see a warrant.  However, the agents did not show her any 
warrant.  Andres also asked the ICE agents to see a warrant.  The ICE agents did not permit 
Andres to read a warrant.” “The ICE agents positioned themselves so that the exits leading to 
the office were blocked.  Adriana and Andres were not free to leave the office area.” Aguilar v. 
ICE, no. 07-1819 (s.D.n.Y.) (complaint filed sep. 20, 2007).  
november 2006, in Clifton, NJ, at 3:00 am, Arturo heard loud banging at his door.  When he 
opened his door slightly, ICE agents forced the door open, shoved him out of the way, and 
illegally searched his home. “During the time that the agents were in Arturo’s home, none 
of the occupants were free to leave. One or more of the John Doe ICE Agents repeatedly 
shouted “Don’t move!” at the occupants in the common room. The agents carried holstered 
firearms.  If an occupant moved, the agents placed their hands on their holstered guns, 
suggesting they were preparing to draw their weapons.” Argueta v. Myers, no. 08-cv-01652 (D. 
nJ) (complaint filed Apr. 3, 2008).
september 2006, in Metter, GA, “The ICE agents involved in the raids forcefully broke 
into many of the trailers in the Plaintiff Robinson’s [trailer] parks.  The ICE agents caused 
intentional damage to at least one door and four windows in the Highway 46 Park.  In the 
Turkey Ridge Road Park, the ICE agents ripped the skirting from the perimeters of a trailer 
and caused damage to the flood boards. Upon information and belief, [ICE Agents] did not 
have warrants or other legal justification for their actions. As a result of the unlawful and 
terrorizing actions of the ICE agents, the tenants who rented from Plaintiff Robinson were 
so terrified that many simply fled from the area.” Mancha v. ICE, no. 06-cv-12650 (n.D.Ga) 
(complaint filed nov. 1, 2006).
september 2006, in Reidsville, GA, “Plaintiff Mancha, a tenth grade high school student, was 
getting ready for school [when her] mother, Plaintiff Martinez, left their home in Reidsville, 
Georgia, to run an errand. [Mancha] believed it was her mother returning, so she went to the 
front door, unlocked the door, left it closed, and went back to her bedroom. Shortly thereafter, 
Plaintiff Mancha heard voices coming from within the house.  She left her bedroom, and, as 
she was walking down the hallway towards the living room, she heard people yelling, ‘Police! 
Illegals!’ When she reached the living room, she saw [ICE Agents] standing in the living room 
blocking the front door. [One ICE Agent] had his hand on his gun as if he was ready to take it 
out any minute.” Mancha v. ICE, no. 06-cv-12650 (n.D.Ga) (complaint filed nov. 1, 2006).
January 2006, in San Francisco, CA, “Mr. G” was installing a washing machine in his garage when 
he heard his doorbell ring. Assuming it was his friend whom he was expecting, Mr. G opened 
the garage door and was immediately grabbed, handcuffed and searched by two individuals 
in plain clothes. Without identifying themselves, the two ICE agents began questioning 
A
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him in English, of which he had limited knowledge. Meanwhile, Mrs. G was cooking when she 
heard the doorbell ring. She went to the front gate and saw a man and a woman in plain clothes. 
As she was unlocking the gate to ask them what they wanted, the man forced the gate open and 
the two individuals entered her house.  Mr. G was led into his house without first being asked 
for his permission to enter. In the house, Mr. G saw his pregnant wife crying and handcuffed to 
a chair, along with two strangers. Because the officers failed to show Mr. and Mrs. G a warrant 
for their arrest, failed to identify themselves as immigration officers, and forced their way into 
their home and handcuffed them before asking them any questions, the Immigration Judge 
concluded that a separate hearing on Mr. and Mrs. G’s motions to suppress was warranted to 
determine whether the suppression of any statements they made during their interrogation and 
arrest is necessary.  Matter of M- (san Francisco, C.A., immigr. Ct., August 16, 2007).
Another repeated theme emerging from the various accounts of iCe home raids is a lack of law 
enforcement professionalism and a kind of cowboy mentality that may contribute to the apparent 
lack of attention to the governing constitutional norms.  For example, during the nassau County 
2007 Community shield operation, iCe agents were criticized for donning cowboy hats and flaunting 
shotguns and automatic weapons.68 Another example involved an April 30, 2007 email, obtained 
under a Freedom of information Act Request, in which a Connecticut iCe agent boasted to a state 
police officer, “We have an [operation] scheduled for Wed, 05/02/07 in new Haven . . .  [i]f you’re 
interested we’d love to have you! We have 18 addresses — so it should be a fun time!! Let me know 
if you guys can play!!”69
these individual accounts alone tell us little about the larger picture of iCe’s conduct during 
home raid operations.  However, the similar pattern of misconduct in these cases together with 
the complaints from political and law enforcement leaders and the empirical evidence drawn 
from arrest reports and suppression motions are sufficient to raise substantial concern over 
iCe’s behavior during its home raid operations.70  together the evidence tells a disturbing story 
of iCe misconduct.  
When viewed together, the evidence is strongly indicative of a pattern of 
misconduct by ICe agents in the new york and new Jersey field Offices and is 
suggestive of a widespread national problem involving:
•	 Agents	illegally	entering	homes	without	legal	authority.
•	 Agents	illegally	seizing	non-target	individuals	during	
home raid operations.  
•	 Agents	illegally	searching	homes	without	legal	authority.
•	 Agents	illegally	seizing	individuals	based	on	racial	or	
ethnic appearance or based on limited english proficiency.
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in order to begin to evaluate policy remedies necessary to bring the agency’s home raid operations into compliance with the Constitution, we must first understand the underlying causes of the problems and must evaluate the full costs of iCe’s current home raid practices.
POtentIAL CAuses Of ICe’s HOMe RAId MIsCOnduCt 
the prevalence of constitutional violations occurring during iCe’s home raids campaign can likely be 
attributed to a number of interrelated factors, including, at least: 1)  a series of 2006 iCe policy changes 
which altered the arrest expectations of iCe’s primary interior enforcement squads; 2) the fact that 
suppression motions are an ineffective deterrent to iCe officers; 3) the barriers that the vulnerable 
target population of iCe home raids faces in availing themselves of traditional civil remedies for 
government misconduct; and, 4) management, training and supervision failures by iCe.  
ICe’s 2006 Performance Policy
in 2006, iCe issued three policy memoranda which set forth a series of dramatic changes in 
its enforcement strategy that collectively set the stage for the Bush Administration’s widely 
publicized campaign of immigration home raids.71  Prior to 2006, iCe Fugitive operation teams 
(Fots), consisting of approximately seven agents each, were expected to arrest 125 target 
“fugitives”  —  people who had been ordered deported but remained in the united states 
— per year.  Moreover, 75% of those arrests were required to be what iCe termed “criminal 
aliens.”  in early 2006, however, iCe increased each Fot’s annual arrest quota from 125 arrests 
per year to 1000 arrests per year without any attendant increase in the size of the teams. 
overnight, Fots were expected to become eight times more efficient.  simultaneously, the new 
2006 quota system eliminated the requirement that 75% of the arrests needed to be “criminal 
aliens.”  several months later, in september 2006,  iCe issued a further change which, for the 
first time, permitted Fots to count “collateral” arrests of civil immigration status violators 
toward their new increased arrest expectations.72  
these policy changes incentivized the pattern of 
unlawful behavior set forth above in at least two 
ways.  First, it placed tremendous pressure on iCe 
agents to meet the new inflated arrest expectations. 
it seems no coincidence that the issuance of iCe’s 
2006 Performance Policy coincided with iCe’s 
increased use of home raids and the spike in 
complaints of misconduct arising therefrom.  the 
pressure of the new expectations likely contributed 
to iCe agents’ disregard for law and policy in their 
zeal to meet their new performance expectations. 
second, the abandonment of the requirement to 
focus on “criminal aliens” and the permission to 
count collateral arrests of civil immigration status 
 AnAlysis
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violators toward their arrest expectations likely 
contributed to the pattern of iCe agents seizing 
non-target residents without legal basis, and illegally 
searching homes for proof of immigration status 
and alienage without permission.  the permission 
to count collateral arrests may also account for the 
high percentage of wrong or stale addresses raided 
by iCe agents.73  Agents are not incentivized to take 
the time necessary to gather reliable intelligence 
on targets; rather, the 2006 Performance Policy 
encourages them to raid any house where they 
believe or suspect they may find immigration status 
violators.  By focusing on the easier to locate civil 
immigration violators, instead of the harder to 
locate dangerous targets, iCe agents were able to 
make more arrests in pursuit of their new arrest 
expectations. unfortunately, the increased arrest 
numbers come at a significant cost, not only in 
terms of the constitutional violations occurring 
during home raids, but also because the focus on 
collateral arrests has caused a significant decrease in 
iCe’s efficiency at capturing their purported priority 
targets: dangerous criminals and terrorists.74
Lack of suppression Motions in Removal Proceedings 
in criminal proceedings, the exclusionary rule is one of the primary mechanisms we rely upon to 
ensure police comply with constitutional search and seizure requirements; however, there are three 
factors which significantly undermine the deterrent effect of suppression motions on iCe agents.  
First, suppression motions are extremely difficult for respondents to win in immigration court.  in 
1984, the supreme Court made clear that suppression is not generally available in immigration 
court.75  the Court did, however, leave the door open for suppression in cases of “egregious” or 
“widespread” constitutional violations.  subsequently, lower courts and the Board of immigration 
Appeals (BiA) have recognized that egregious constitutional violations do warrant suppression in 
removal proceedings.  While the definition of “egregiousness” remains murky and largely unsettled, 
one thing remains clear: proving an “egregious” constitutional violation remains a significantly 
higher hurdle than is required in criminal suppression motions.76  
second, there is only a relatively small subset of deportation cases where suppression motions 
can alter the outcome of the proceedings.  suppression motions are inconsequential if iCe has 
an alternative source of evidence wholly independent of the constitutional violation.   suppression 
motions are, therefore, only useful in the uncommon instances where there is some ambiguity 
by focusing on the easier 
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to locate dangerous targets, 
ice agents were able to make 
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about whether or not the respondent is actually a united states citizen.  iCe bears the burden of 
proving that a person is not a citizen before the person can be deported.  if the only evidence iCe 
has of the person’s nationality was obtained through an egregious violation of the constitution, 
then a suppression motion may bear fruit.  However, in most other circumstances, a suppression 
motion  —  even if granted  —  would be futile.  
Finally, largely because of these first two factors, unlike criminal practice, suppression motions 
have not traditionally been a standard part of removal defense practice.  thus, unlike their police 
counterparts, most iCe agents have never been called to testify and account for their conduct at a 
suppression hearing.  
Accordingly, the threat of evidence being excluded due to the unconstitutional conduct of iCe 
officers does not act as an effective deterrent to iCe agents carrying out home raids, or conducting 
other types of operations. While the exclusionary rule has played a critical role in deterring Fourth 
Amendment violations in the criminal context, the factors set forth above, together, work to make 
suppression motions in deportation proceedings relatively rare occurrences and undermine the 
deterrent value of such motions on iCe officers’ conduct in the field.  
Barriers to Civil Remedies
Due to a variety of systemic and cultural factors, immigrants are amongst the most vulnerable 
of populations in this nation’s legal system.  Fifty-two percent of the foreign born population are 
limited english proficient.  immigrants are also disproportionately poor and are significantly more 
likely to be lacking in basic education.77 Accordingly, many immigrants simply lack the inclination 
and financial resources to hire private counsel.78 immigrants are also often unfamiliar with the 
u.s. legal system and unaware of their rights under domestic tort law.  in addition, many victims 
of home raids are held in immigration detention following the raids on their homes and then 
deported  —  limiting their opportunities to pursue civil lawsuits.  these realities make it extremely 
difficult for immigrants who are the subject of Fourth Amendment violations during iCe home 
raids to avail themselves of traditional civil remedies. Accordingly, traditional civil remedies are also 
ineffective deterrents to unlawful iCe home raids.
Management and Oversight failures by ICe
Finally, iCe official policy has been crystal clear for some time that officers cannot enter or search 
homes without judicial warrants or consent and may not seize persons without a reasonable 
suspicion that the person is illegally in the united states.79  However, notwithstanding these 
clear official policies, the evidence indicates that iCe agents are not routinely observing these 
agency policies.  this type of disconnect between agency policy and practice is likely indicative of 
management, training and oversight failures by iCe supervisors and officials.80 
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IMPACt Of ICe HOMe MIsCOnduCt On LOCAL LAW 
enfORCeMent And PuBLIC sAfety
the constitutional violations during iCe home raids are, of course, most directly harmful to the 
people whose homes are invaded and whose rights are violated, but the costs of iCe misconduct 
in its home raid operations reach far beyond those individuals.  iCe’s home raid misconduct also 
undermines the traditional crime fighting mission of local law enforcement agencies.  
in immigrant communities, local police are increasingly perceived as in cahoots with iCe agents 
carrying out home raids.  this is in part because of actual cooperation between many police 
agencies and iCe, often in the form of detailing local officers to accompany iCe agents on home 
raid operations.  However, even in circumstances where no local police are actually involved, iCe 
agents often identify themselves as “police” presumably because they suspect residents are more 
likely to cooperate with local police than with iCe.  Because of the actual and perceived cooperation 
between local police agencies and iCe agents conducting home raids, iCe misconduct during 
those raids threatens to taint local officers’ relationships with immigrant communities.  
the three major law enforcement reports on the role of local police in immigration enforcement have 
all recognized the ways local involvement in immigration enforcement can undermine community 
policing strategies by making immigrant witnesses and victims of crime less likely to cooperate 
with local police.81 Renewed emphasis on community policing strategies by local police agencies 
has been credited, in part, with significant nationwide declines in crime.  Community policing 
strategies are dependent on cooperative relationships between police and the communities they 
serve.  to the extent iCe misconduct is undermining these relationships, it makes the job of local 
police officers more difficult and can thereby undermine public safety.  
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the policy recommendations below were developed in close consultation with the Law enforcement Advisory Panel after the panel had the opportunity to review the findings above and share their experiences regarding iCe home raid operations.  the Advisory Panel 
was guided by a collective belief that: iCe has a valid mission and that any recommendations 
should support and advance that mission, that all law enforcement officers must conform their 
behavior to the strictures of the Constitution, that iCe operations should always attempt to 
avoid interference with vital local community policing policies, and that sound law enforcement 
strategy and practices should inform iCe home raid operations.  Moreover, the recommendations 
below should in no way be interpreted as an indictment of iCe agents who have followed iCe 
procedures and adhered to the Constitution.  
it is worth noting at the outset that the Department of Homeland security under current 
secretary Janet napolitano has already taken some positive steps toward reforming the 2006 
Performance Policy that appears to have precipitated much of the abuses outlined in this report. 
on January 30, 2009, secretary napolitano issued a directive calling for an internal review and 
assessment of iCe’s Fot program.82  subsequently, DHs announced the abandonment of its 
1000 arrest per year goal.  DHs now requires that each interior enforcement team “identify 
and target  —  though not necessarily arrest  —  50 fugitives per month, as well as 500 a year 
as part of operations with other teams.”83  the increased focus on identification and targeting 
—  in contrast to arrest expectations — is a significant improvement that should prompt iCe 
teams to concentrate their efforts on appropriate intelligence gathering. these are positive 
steps, which together with the recommendations set forth below, should help correct the 
problems outlined in this report.
LIMIt use Of HOMe RAId OPeRAtIOns
1. home raids should be used as a tactic of last resort, and then only to 
make criminal arrests or civil arrests for targets who pose a real risk to 
national security or who have violent criminal records.
DHs secretary napolitano has repeatedly emphasized her intention to focus iCe’s limited 
enforcement resources on apprehending the narrow class of immigrants who pose a real danger 
to the public.84  Home raids are extremely resource intensive and, as currently employed, an 
inefficient use of scarce internal enforcement resources.85 in addition, home raid operations carry 
with them several significant costs, including: physical danger to residents and officers, costs to 
local community policing efforts, significant privacy intrusions for residents, and potential legal 
liability for the agencies involved.  in light of these factors and in light of the record of abuses 
during home raid operations outlined in this report, sound policing policy dictates that home 
raids should be a tactic of last resort reserved for truly high priority targets.
 policy recommendAtions
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RevIse WARRAnt PRACtICe
2. ice should obtain judicial warrants in advance of any home raid.
Federal courts possess authority to issue search and/or arrest warrants for iCe home raids.86 
iCe’s practice of using administrative warrants for home raids is, therefore, a policy decision 
presumably driven by administrative convenience, not law.  unfortunately, this convenience 
appears to have contributed to iCe’s failure to devote adequate resources to intelligence 
gathering.  By using administrative warrants, iCe is not required to demonstrate to a neutral 
magistrate its probable cause to arrest a target and its basis for believing that the target will 
be at a given residence.  too often, this has led iCe to identify target residences based on 
insufficient intelligence  —  leading to intrusions into innocent residents’ homes and to iCe’s 
failure to capture targets.
the procedures for obtaining a judicial warrant would be a healthy incentive for iCe to refocus 
its interior enforcement teams on appropriate intelligence gathering on high priority dangerous 
targets.  in a related arena, DHs secretary napolitano has recently issued guidelines directing 
iCe agents to increase their use of judicial warrants in worksite enforcement operations as part of 
an attempt to impose “high investigative standards.”87  Having recognized the power of judicial 
oversight to heighten investigative standards, secretary napolitano should extend that same logic 
and guidance to home raid operations.  
obtaining judicial warrants would certainly impose some additional burden on iCe; however, it is a 
burden that virtually every other law enforcement agency in the nation is faced with and overcomes 
with relative ease.  if iCe limits its use of home raids as suggested above, and refocuses its interior 
enforcement teams toward locating and arresting truly dangerous targets, it should have abundant 
resources to properly investigate its targets and obtain judicial warrants.  such warrants would 
not only incentivize appropriate pre-raid investigations but would also eliminate many of the 
problematic issues set forth in this report.
3. to the extent ice continues to use home raids to execute administrative 
warrants, it should require field offices to obtain high-level centralized 
pre-approval in advance of any home raid operation.  
While judicial review is preferable, proven and available, if iCe chooses to forego a judicial warrant, 
a procedure should be adopted requiring agents from iCe field offices to obtain pre-approval from 
iCe headquarters before conducting any home raid.  the agents requesting approval should be 
required to justify their request by explaining the basis for their assessment of the dangerousness 
of the target, their determination that the target is likely to be at a given residence, and their 
conclusion that apprehending the target outside the home is impracticable. 
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RevIse COnsent PROCeduRes
4. whenever ice conducts a home entry without a judicial warrant, it should 
ensure that it obtains valid consent by explicitly and clearly informing 
residents of their right to refuse consent and then obtaining written consent, 
of clear scope, before entry is made.  
the Constitution does not always require officers to advise residents of their right to refuse entry when 
officers seek consent to enter a home.88  However, it is well established that factors such as: whether 
the individual understands the right to refuse to consent, whether an individual understands english, 
whether the individual was informed of her Miranda rights prior to the consent, whether the individual 
is familiar with the American legal system, and whether the police encounter occurred in a public or 
secluded location, are all relevant to determining whether valid consent was obtained.89  Moreover, 
mere acquiescence to a show of force or legal authority is not consistent with the constitutional consent 
requirement nor is the mere failure of an individual to object to police intrusion.90  Finally, permission to 
enter a residence does not necessarily authorize agents to search all parts of the residence — particularly 
in the case of multiple occupancy dwellings.  Agents must clarify the scope of any consent obtained.    
in light of these legal requirements and the record of non-consensual entries outlined in this report, 
sound policing policy dictates that iCe agents should, as a matter of policy, always explicitly and 
clearly inform residents of their right to refuse consent before entering a home without a judicial 
warrant.  Many local police departments follow this practice and use standard consent forms  — 
sometimes referred to as “speed sheets”  —  to deliver warnings and record written consent. 
iCe should adopt a similar practice. Moreover, iCe should always have an agent who speaks the 
language of the target on site for any home raid to ensure that informed consent is obtained.  
5. tactical pre-dawn or nighttime home raids should only be conducted with 
judicial warrants.  
As iCe regulations explain, “in order to enter a residence [without a judicial warrant], someone 
who has authority to do so must grant informed consent.”91  tactical pre-dawn or nighttime home 
entries, conducted by heavily armed seven member teams, with residents who often do not speak 
english and are unfamiliar with American legal norms, are simply not consistent with obtaining 
informed consent.  Acquiescence to authority is not consent.92  Accordingly, tactical pre-dawn or 
nighttime home raids should only be conducted with judicial warrants.  
IMPROve suPeRvIsIOn And tRAInInG Of ICe HOMe RAId teAMs
6. require a high level supervisor to be on site for all home raids.
Because of the dangerousness and level of privacy intrusion involved, many police departments require 
a high level supervisor to be on site to supervise any home raid operation.  iCe Fots have one agent 
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designated as a “team Leader” who is generally present during any home raid operation.93  “supervisors 
are encouraged,” but not required, “to accompany teams into the field” for home raid operations.94 
However, as compared to the practice of many local police departments, such team leaders do not seem 
sufficiently senior to oversee highly sensitive home raid operations.  the record of abuses occurring 
during home raid operations supports the conclusion that more intensive and responsible supervision 
is required.  Accordingly, a high level supervisor should be on site for any iCe home raid operation to 
ensure that entry does not occur absent consent or a judicial warrant and, if consent is obtained, that the 
supervisor immediately notify the entire team of the bounds of the consent obtained.
7. videotape home raids.
increasingly, police departments are videotaping sensitive situations that may involve even 
allegations that officers failed to observe constitutional rights.95  Given the sensitivity of home 
raid operations and the record of iCe abuses in such operations, iCe should institute a policy of 
videotaping home raids.  such a policy would both incentivize agents to comply with constitutional 
norms and would protect iCe against unfounded allegations of misconduct.  
8. retrain relevant agents on home raid procedures. require periodic 
refresher training on such procedures.  
At minimum, the findings of this report should be a strong indication to iCe that its interior 
enforcement teams are in need of additional training on home raid procedures.  this includes 
additional training for iCe supervisors.  Moreover, periodic refresher trainings should be a regular 
and ongoing part of agents’ professional development.  
MInIMIze HARM tO LOCAL POLICe AGenCIes’ COMMunIty 
POLICInG effORts
9. local police agencies should, at all times, be notified of the planning and 
results of ice operations within their jurisdictions.
too often, iCe has failed to adequately collaborate with local police agencies.  Police agencies need adequate 
advance warning of such operations to permit them time to collaborate with iCe on ways to mitigate harm 
to local community policing efforts.  Moreover, iCe needs to share information in a timely fashion on the 
results of an operation, including the details of any individuals taken into custody.  such information is 
necessary to allow local police to respond to common community inquiries after an iCe operation.  
10. ice should not request assistance of local police for the purpose of deceiving 
residents as to the identity of the agency conducting a home raid operation.
As a general matter, local police should be called upon to assist iCe when such assistance is 
necessary to ensure community or officer safety or when iCe anticipates that it will encounter 
Constitution on iCe   b   Cardozo immigration Justice Clinic   b   31
individuals involved in local criminal activity.  However, iCe’s routine practice of requesting a 
marked local police cruiser to accompany iCe agents on home raids often produces the effect of 
deceiving residents about which agency is conducting a home raid — an outcome which significantly 
undermines local police agencies’ community policing efforts.  such deception is likely to make 
residents less willing to open the door for local police in the future and may deter some immigrant 
victims and witnesses of crimes from contacting local police.  to guard against the misimpression 
that iCe agents are local law enforcement, agents should be trained to stop identifying themselves 
as “police” and instead identify themselves as “immigration, ” “iCe,” or “federal agents.” iCe must 
assure that those impacted by the raid clearly understand that those conducting the raid are federal 
agents, and the agencies involved are clearly identified.
MInIMIze IntRusIOn tO nOn-tARGets enCOunteRed 
11. ensure that performance targets for ice interior enforcement teams 
set realistic goals, provide incentives for teams to focus on dangerous 
targets, and award teams no incentive to divert scarce resources to 
collateral arrests of mere civil immigration violators.
the detrimental effects of iCe’s 2006 Performance Policy are plain to see.  the new policies 
precipitated both the increase in constitutional violations outlined in this report and the 
decrease in efficiency of interior enforcement teams at capturing dangerous high priority 
targets.96  the 2006 policy should be abandoned and replaced with a policy that sets realistic 
goals for interior enforcement teams and creates incentives for teams to focus efforts exclusively 
on high priority targets.  
DHs should be credited for the steps it has already taken to revise the 2006 policies.97  However, 
without full details on the new policy, it is impossible to determine if the policy requires teams to 
focus on high priority targets.  specifically, iCe should make clear that teams get no additional 
performance credit for making collateral arrests and should focus their limited resources exclusively 
on violent criminals and national security threats.  
12. clear guidance should be issued that the sole objective of a home raid is 
to apprehend the target  —  agents should not generally question non-
targets encountered in or around the residence about matters other than 
the location of the target.
too often since 2006, iCe agents have used home raid operations, purportedly seeking an individual 
target, as an opportunity to seize and question non-targets in and around the target residence for 
the purpose of random investigatory questioning.  Revision of the performance targets discussed 
above and eliminating credit for collateral arrests should help curb this type of behavior.  However, 
in addition to the revised performance goals, iCe should issue clear guidance that the privacy of 
non-target individuals encountered during home raids should be respected and that such raids 
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should not be used as opportunities to question collaterals on subjects other than the location of 
the target.  the sole objective of a home raid should be to apprehend the target.
 When agents are lawfully inside a home, they are permitted to briefly seize individuals to conduct 
a protective sweep when they reasonably believe that the premises harbor a person who poses a 
danger to the agents.  However, the temptation is for officers to improperly use such seizures as an 
opportunity to conduct baseless investigatory interviews of non-target individuals.  if non-targets 
need to be temporarily seized for a protective sweep, such temporary detention should not be used 
as an opportunity for investigatory questions regarding non-targets’ immigration status. 
13. A new regulation should be issued to require officers to note the reason why 
they initially seized and questioned any individual in their arrest report.
Federal regulations already require iCe agents to note whether consent to enter a residence was 
obtained and, if so, from whom.98  the apparent purpose of this regulation is to remind officers of 
their constitutional requirement to obtain consent and to hold them accountable for their behavior. 
the same rationale applies with equal force to the physical seizure of individuals by iCe agents 
—  especially in light of the record set forth above regarding a pattern of unlawful seizures of 
non-target individuals.  Accordingly, iCe should require its agents to note the basis for their initial 
seizure of individuals in their arrest reports.  
14. clear guidance should be issued that neither racial nor ethnic appearance 
nor limited english proficiency is ever a sufficient sole basis for seizing 
or questioning an individual.
iCe officers must have, at minimum, reasonable suspicion that a person has violated the law 
in order to seize the individual, even for investigatory questioning.99  in no situation is racial or 
ethnic appearance or limited english proficiency ever a sufficient basis for seizing and questioning 
an individual.100  the empirical data above, suggestive of racial profiling by iCe agents, warrants 
additional clear guidance on this settled point of law. Current iCe policy undoubtedly forbids this 
illegal behavior but additional guidance and training on this point is necessary to protect non-target 
individuals during iCe home raids. 
IMPROve ACCOuntABILIty 
15. the dhs office of the inspector general (oig) should undertake an 
investigation of the pattern of misconduct established in this report to 
better assess the national scope of the problem.
the data from Long island and new Jersey are strong indicators of pervasive problems in the 
new York and new Jersey iCe field offices and the other evidence set forth above is suggestive of 
a national trend.  the public’s ability to fully assess the scope of this problem is, however, limited 
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by incomplete access to relevant iCe records and by our inability to interview iCe employees 
and arrestees.  oiG does not suffer from these same limitations and, based upon the record 
of misconduct set forth in this report, should undertake a broader national investigation of iCe 
misconduct during home raid operations.  such a report should be followed up by periodic spot 
checks of arrest records and interviews with agents and arrestees at various field offices to monitor 
the problem over time.101  
16. establish a revised clear public complaint procedure, managed by oig, for 
allegations involving violations of constitutional rights by ice agents.  
Currently iCe’s office of Professional Responsibility (oPR) generally handles any investigation of 
iCe constitutional violations occurring during home raid or other operations.  unfortunately, oPR 
has been unresponsive to many such complaints and appears to lack the independence necessary 
to properly scrutinize iCe conduct.  in contrast, oiG is more removed from iCe field offices 
and has, in the past, demonstrated its ability to provide effective oversight to iCe operations.102 
Accordingly, DHs should establish an oversight unit in oiG to handle community complaints of 
iCe misconduct.  oiG should make its complaint procedure widely known and easily available to 
local law enforcement and political leaders, immigrant advocates, and the general public.  oiG 
should ensure that complaints are thoroughly investigated and that complainants receive timely 
responses.  oiG should, of course, receive such additional funding and staffing as is necessary to 
accomplish these tasks.
17. enact regulations disallowing the use of evidence that has been obtained 
through violation of the constitution in removal proceedings. 
in 1984, the supreme Court held that constitutional violations do not require suppression of 
evidence in immigration removal proceedings; at least in the absence of egregious or widespread 
constitutional violations.103  However, nothing prohibits DHs or the Department of Justice (which 
oversees the immigration courts) from excluding constitutionally tainted evidence as a matter of 
policy.  Moreover, the rationale of the supreme Court’s 1984 decision is in some tension with the 
findings of this report.  Most importantly, the Court placed significant reliance upon iCe’s ability 
to develop its “own comprehensive scheme for deterring Fourth Amendment violations by its 
officers.” 104 this report strongly suggests that iCe’s “comprehensive scheme” has broken down. 
Local police officials recognize the power of the exclusionary rule to help conform officers’ behavior 
to the strictures of the Constitution.  in light of the record of misconduct set forth in this report, 
imposing this common rule of law enforcement in the immigration realm would be an important 
step toward ensuring that iCe home raid operations, and all iCe operations, are conducted in 
accordance with the Constitution.  
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